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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4732
This paper uses a new, 2005/06 nationally-representative 
household survey to analyze the impact of internal 
remittances (from Ghana) and international remittances 
(from African and other countries) on poverty and 
inequality in Ghana. To control for selection and 
endogeneity, it uses a two-stage multinomial logit model 
with instrumental variables focusing on variations in 
migration networks and remittances among various 
ethno-religious groups in Ghana. The paper finds that 
both internal and international remittances reduce the 
level, depth, and severity of poverty in Ghana.  However, 
the size of the poverty reduction depends on the type 
of remittances received. In general, poverty in Ghana is 
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Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the impact of migration and remittances on poverty and 
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reduced more by international than internal remittances. 
For households receiving international remittances, 
the level of poverty falls by 88.1 percent with the 
inclusion of remittances; for households receiving 
internal remittances, poverty falls by 69.4 percent with 
the inclusion of remittances. The paper also finds that 
both types of remittances increase income inequality in 
Ghana. For households with internal remittances, the 
inclusion of remittances causes the Gini coefficient to 
rise by 4 percent, and for households with international 
remittances, the inclusion of remittances causes the Gini 
to increase by 17.4 percent. 
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  Remittances refer to the money and goods that are transmitted to households by 
migrant workers working outside of their origin communities, either in urban areas or 
abroad.  At the start of the 21
st century, these resource transfers represent one of the key 
issues in economic development.  While the total level of internal remittances in the 
developing world is unknown, in 2005 international remittances to the developing world 
amounted to US $191 billion (World Bank, 2008).  In that year the level of international 
remittances was about 50 percent larger than the level of official development aid to the 
developing world. 
  What is the impact of these large remittance flows on poverty and inequality in the 
developing world?  The answer to this question seems central to any attempt to evaluate the 
overall effect of migration and remittances on the developing countries of Latin America, 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.  While a number of studies have examined the impact of 
internal and international remittances on poverty and inequality in Latin America and 
Asia,
1 relatively few studies have tried to evaluate these issues in the region of the world 
where poverty rates are the highest:  Sub-Saharan Africa.
2    
  The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of internal and international 
remittances on poverty and inequality in the Sub-Saharan African country of Ghana.  
Ghana represents a good case study for examining these issues.  Not only is the estimated 
level of poverty high in Ghana,
3 but the country also produces a large number of internal 
migrants (to urban areas) and international migrants (to African and other countries).  Since 
households in Ghana are more likely to produce internal rather than international migrants,   3
but the value of remittances received from internal migrants is much less than that received 
from international migrants, it is likely that these two types of resource transfers will have 
differing effects on poverty and inequality.
4    
At the outset it should be emphasized that any effort to examine the impact of 
remittances (internal or international) on poverty and inequality involves several important 
methodological issues.  On the one hand, it is possible to treat remittances as a simple 
exogenous transfer of income by migrants.  When treated as an exogenous transfer, the 
economic question becomes:  How do remittances, in total or at the margin, affect the 
observed level of poverty and inequality in a specific country?  This is the basic question 
addressed by Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) in their study of remittances and poverty in 
Lesotho.  On the other hand, it is also possible to treat remittances as a potential substitute 
for domestic (home) earnings.  When treated as a potential substitute for home earnings, 
the economic question becomes:  How does the observed level of poverty and inequality in 
a country compare to a counterfactual scenario without migration and remittances but 
including an imputation for the home earnings of migrants had those people stayed and 
worked at home?  This latter treatment seems to represent the more interesting (and 
challenging) economic question because it uses econometric techniques to compare the 
level of poverty and inequality in a country with and without remittances.
5   
  One of the contributions of this paper is that it develops counterfactual income 
estimates for migrant and non-migrant households by using econometric estimations to 
predict the incomes of households with and without remittances.  However, this approach 
has its own methodological difficulties.  Most notably, the attempt to predict (estimate) the 
incomes of migrant households on the basis of the observed incomes of non-migrant   4
households is subject to the problems of selection bias and endogeneity.  If migrant and 
non-migrant households differ systematically in their unobservable characteristics (e.g. 
skills, motivation, ability), there will be selection bias in any estimates of income which are 
based on non-migrant households.  We address this concern by using a two-stage 
multinomial logit selection model to test for selection bias in the household receipt of 
remittances.  However, ensuring the exogeneity of the variables used in the specification of 
this selection model is not straight-forward.  To address this issue we use an instrumental 
variables approach, focusing on variations in migration networks and remittances among 
various ethno-religious groups in Ghana.  Based on the results of our selection model we 
then proceed to estimate an expenditure model that allows us to determine the impact of 
internal and international remittances on poverty and inequality in Ghana.  
  The paper proceeds in eight further parts.  Section 1 presents the data.  Since the 
problems of selection and identification are so important, Section 2 presents the two-stage 
multinomial logit selection model, and Section 3 discusses the various identification issues 
involved in estimating this model.  Section 4 estimates the selection model using an 
instrumental variables approach, employing variations in migration networks and 
remittances at the ethno-religious level.  Section 5 estimates the selection-corrected 
predicted expenditure functions, and Sections 6 and 7 use these predicted expenditures to 
analyze the impact of internal and international remittances on poverty and inequality in 
Ghana. Section 8 concludes. 
     5
1.  Data 
 Data for this study come from the 2005/06 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 
5), a new, nationally-representative survey of 8,000 households carried out by the Ghana 
Statistical Service (GSS).  This survey, administered from September 2005 to September 
2006, contains detailed information on all aspects of living conditions in Ghana, including 
income, expenditure, health, education, savings, and credit.  As part of this survey, a 
supplemental migration and remittances module was administered to a nationally 
representative sub-sample of 4,000 households.
6  This paper uses the data from the 
migration and remittances sub-sample of 4,000 households.  In carrying out the analysis we 
dropped 59 households because of missing data, which resulted in a sample of 3,941 
households.   
  Since the focus here is on remittances, it is important to clarify how these income 
transfers are measured and defined.  Data on remittances includes transfers received in 
three forms:  (1) money (cash); (2) food; and (3) non-food goods.
7  While most remittances 
(about 75 percent) come in the form of money (cash), including food and non-food goods is 
important because it leads to a more accurate measure of the total flow of remittances to 
households in Ghana.  In this study each household that is classified as receiving 
remittances – either internal (from Ghana) or international (from African or other 
countries) -- is assumed to receive exactly the amount reported in the survey.  Households 
which report having migrants but do not report receiving remittances are classified as non-
remittance receiving households.  Using this definition distinguishes our work from much 
of the previous literature on migration and remittances by focusing on the origin of income 
flows rather than presence or absence of a migrant in the household.  This approach seems   6
sensible for three reasons: (1) only about one-half of all migrants in Ghana remit;
 8 (2) 
about 50 percent of all remittance-receiving households in the survey do not have a 
migrant; and (3) if we attempted to measure differences according to migration cum 
remittances behavior, the number of observations for each cell would be very small.  In 
Ghana, where family ties are very strong, migration is different from remittances because 
households without migrants can receive internal or international remittances from relatives 
(e.g. cousins, aunts, uncles) and close friends.
9   
  Table 1 presents summary data from the 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-
sample). Since we want to work with three exclusive groups of households, in this table 
and in all subsequent tables, we have dropped the 57 households that receive remittances 
from both internal and international sources.  Of the remaining 3,884 households, 2,515 
households (64.7 percent) receive no remittances, 1,159 households (29.8 percent) receive 
internal remittances (from Ghana) and 210 (5.4 percent) receive international remittances 
(from African or other countries). 
  Table 1 reveals several interesting contrasts between the three groups of 
households, that is, those receiving no remittances, those receiving internal remittances 
(from Ghana)  and those receiving international remittances (from African or other 
countries).  With respect to human capital, the table shows that households receiving 
international remittances generally have more human capital than households with no 
remittances, while households receiving internal remittances usually have less.  The table 
also shows that households receiving international remittances have the highest mean per 
capita expenditure, while households receiving internal remittances have the lowest mean 
expenditure.   7
 2.  An Econometric Model of Household Incomes with Selection Controls 
  Since most poverty economists use expenditure rather than income data to identify 
poverty,
10 it is tempting to use the mean per capita expenditure figures in Table 1 to 
conclude that households receiving international remittances are less likely to be poor.  
However, it is important to realize that these expenditure figures are “naïve” and cannot be 
used to evaluate the “real” effect of remittances on poverty in Ghana.  Households have 
both observed and unobserved characteristics.  Since the expenditure results in Table 1 may 
be caused by the unobserved characteristics of households (e.g. skills, motivation, ability), 
it is important to use special econometric techniques to identify the impact of these 
unobservables in order to pinpoint the “real” impact of remittances on expenditures and 
poverty in Ghana. 
Specifically, it is necessary to estimate a counterfactual scenario in which we 
estimate the expenditures for households that receive internal or international remittances, 
and then compare these expenditures with an unobserved scenario in which these 
households do not receive remittances. Constructing such a counterfactual can be done by 
treating households with no remittances as a random draw from the population, estimating 
a mean regression of incomes for these no-remittance households, and then using the 
resulting parameter estimates to predict the incomes of households with internal and 
international remittances.  However, this approach becomes problematic if households with 
and without remittances differ systematically in their unobservable characteristics (e.g. 
skills, motivation, ability), because then the regression results will be biased.  The approach 
followed in this paper is to estimate a different equation for each type of remittance-
receiving household, taking into account in the estimation the selection bias. This kind of   8
approach is based on a selection model developed by Lee (1983) and Bourguignon, 
Fournier and Gurgand (2004).
11 
Assume that households can select between three states (r): (1) receive no 
remittances; (2) receive internal remittances (from Ghana); and (3) receive international 
remittances (from African or other countries).
12  Once households have chosen their state, 
they decide their level of expenditure yr, where yr is the optimal expenditure for households 
that chose r=r . On this basis, we have a polychotomous-choice model (Lee, 1983), where 
we have an expenditure equation for each possible state r.  
Yr  = βr + arZ+ur                                                                          (1) 
And for each choice we have a latent variable: 
   Ir=Xψr+ηr                                                                                    (2) 
Notice that X is a set of characteristics of the households, which includes all 
variables in Z, plus instrumental variables. Now we have that: 
I=r if Ir>Max Ij (j=1,2,3,j≠r)                                                        (3) 
Let εr= Max Ir – ηr (j=1,2,3,j≠r)                                                  (4) 
If ηr follows a type I extreme value distribution, Domencich and McFadden (1975) 
show that εr has the following distribution function: 
 F r(ε)=Prob(εr< ε)=exp(ε)/( exp(ε)+∑j≠sexp(Xψj))                      (5) 
Moreover, the following transformation is used: 
ε*r=Jr(εr)=Φ-1(Fr(ε))                                                                  (6) 
where Φ is the cdf for the standard normal, and ε*r follows a standard normal. From which, 
Lee (1983) showed that an equation like (1) can be rewritten as: 
yr  = βr + arX –σrρrφ[Jr(Xψr)]/ Fr(Xψr) + vr                                (7)   9
where σ2r=var (ur), φ is the pdf for the standard normal and ρr is the correlation coefficient 
between ur and ε*r. Moreover, E(vr|X,Z)=0.  
The Lee method (1983), which will be used in this analysis, consists of estimating a 
two-stage multinomial logit model, where the first-stage choice equation is based on 
equation (2) and the second-stage expenditure equation is based on equation (7).  It should 
be emphasized that this Lee method is a generalization of the Heckman two-stage method 
of selection correction. As in the case of the Heckman method, the identification of 
equation (7) depends on both the existence of instrumental variables and the non-linearity 
of the selection part of the model. In principle, the non-linearity of the selection part of the 
model is sufficient to identify the parameters of the model, because this non-linearity helps 
break the relation between the selection part and the rest of the expenditure equation. 
However, as discussed below, we use instrumental variables to obtain independent 
variations in the first-stage choice equation that identify the second-stage expenditure 
equation. 
To implement our two-stage multinomial model, it is necessary to identify variables 
that are distinct for the receipt of remittances in the first-stage equation, and for the 
determination of household expenditure in the second-stage equation.  The model is 
identifiable if there is at least one independent variable in the first-stage choice function 
that is not in the second-stage expenditure function.   
The main econometric problem lies in selecting the variables that should go into the 
equations.  Identifying variables that are truly exogenous to the receipt of remittances is 
difficult.  While some variables – such as age of household head – are probably exogenous 
to household decision-making, other variables – such as those relating to household   10
education – are more problematic.  In the literature, the cleanest strategies for identifying 
exogenous variables affecting migration and/or the receipt of remittances have focused on 
short-term economic shocks.  For example, Yang (2006) uses panel data from the 1997 
Asian currency crisis to analyze how short-term changes in currency rates affect the value 
of international remittances received by Filipino households.  Since our Ghana data come 
from a single, cross-sectional survey, we are not aware of any identifiable exogenous 
shocks to exploit in our data set.   
To address the problem of endogenous variables, we construct two instrumental 
variables using the following procedure.  Past research has found that migration networks 
are important in migration decisions and the receipt of remittances (e.g. Woodruff and 
Zenteno, 2007, Munshi, 2003).  Since ethnicity and religion represent two important forms 
of association in Ghana, we assume that households in Ghana will form migration networks 
on the basis of ethnicity and religion.  On this basis, we partitioned the data from the 
2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample) into 15 ethno-religious groups.  We defined 
these ethno-religious groups by classifying households according to five religious and three 
ethnographic groups. The five religious groups are: (1) Catholic and Anglican; (2) 
Presbyterian and Methodist; (3) Pentecostal, Spiritualist and other Christian; (4) Muslim; 
and (5) all others.
13  The three ethnographic groups include: (1) households belonging to 
ethnic groups representing 17% or more of the population in 1998/99 (e.g., Asante and 
other Akan); (2) households belonging to ethnic groups representing between 10% and 
15% of the population in 1998/99 (e.g., Fanti, Ga-Adangbe, Ewe); and (3) all other 
households.
14      11
Table 2 shows how the households in the Ghana data are distributed across the 15 
ethno-religious groups. The table shows that three ethno-religious groups – groups, 3, 8 and 
14 – account for 42 percent of the sample. The table also shows the two variables that are 
used as instrument variables in this paper:  (1) international remittances (from African or 
other countries) received as a percent of household income in the ethno-religious group; 
and (2) international migrants (to African or other countries) as a percent of the population 
of the ethno-religious group.   
According to Table 2, international remittances and migrants are distributed quite 
unevenly among the various ethno-religious groups.  This uneven distribution suggests that 
some ethno-religious groups are more “efficient” than others, if we measure efficiency by 
how much remittance income is received by households in the different groups.  For 
example, focusing on the three largest ethno-religious groups in Table 2 (groups 3, 8 and 
14), we see that each group accounts for about 14 percent of the sample.  However, each 
group produces international migrants at different rates (less than one percent for groups 8 
and 14, and 3.1 percent for group 3), and receives remittances at different rates (between 5 
and 8 percent of observed household income for each group). This variation in the 
efficiency of migrant networks to generate remittance income is important to our analysis 
because it helps explain why these variables work well as instruments in our econometric 
procedure.  In the next section we present tests that demonstrate the validity and strength of 
these instruments.   12
3.  Specifying and Identifying the Econometric Model 
In specifying the model we use the two instrumental variables discussed above to 
obtain independent variations in the first stage-choice equation that serve to identify the 
second- stage expenditure equation.  The rationale for using these two variables as 
instruments is that they are correlated with the size and efficiency of the ethno-religious 
group in producing migrants and in generating remittances.  Our identifying assumption is 
that conditional on a given set of covariates, these instrumental variables do not belong in 
the second-stage expenditure equation. We will be more specific on our identifying 
assumption shortly. 
  The first-stage choice equation of the model can be estimated as follows: 
Prob (Y = receive remittances) = f [Human Capital (Number of  
household members with primary, junior secondary, secondary or university 
education), Household Characteristics (Age of household head, Square of 
the Age of household head, Household size, Number of males over age 15, 
Number of children under age 5), Migration Networks, (Number of female-
headed households receiving internal remittances (from Ghana) in 1998/99, 
Number of female-headed households receiving international remittances 
(from African or other countries) in 1998/99, Square of internal migrants in 
1998/99), Ethno-religious Characteristics ( Square of  income of ethno-
religious group), Instrumental Variables, Regional and Ethnic Variables, 
Interactions]                                                     (8) 
    13
The rationale for including these variables in the first-stage choice equation follows 
the standard literature on migration and remittances.  According to the basic human capital 
model, human capital variables are likely to affect migration because more educated people 
enjoy greater employment and expected income-earning possibilities in destination areas  
(Schultz, 1982; Todaro, 1970).
15 In the literature household characteristics – such as age of 
household head and number of male members and children – are also hypothesized to 
affect the probability of migration and the receipt of remittances.  In particular, some 
analysts (Adams, 1993; Lipton, 1980) have suggested that migration is a life-cycle event in 
which households with older heads, more males over age 15 and fewer children under age 
5 are more likely to participate. With respect to migration networks, the sociological 
literature has stressed the importance of family and village networks in encouraging 
migration (Massey, Goldring and Durand, 1994; Massey, 1987).  For this reason, the first-
stage equation includes three variables measuring migration networks at the level of the 
ethno-religious group:  the number of female-headed households receiving internal 
remittances (from Ghana) in 1998/99; the number of female-headed households receiving 
international remittances (from African or other countries) in 1998/99); and the square of 
the number of internal migrants in 1998/99.  Each of these network variables is measured at 
the level of the ethno-religious group for the year of the last Ghana GLSS Survey (GLSS 4 
in 1998/99).   The first-stage equation also includes the two instrumental variables 
discussed above, as well as the control variable, square of income in the ethno-religious 
group of the household.  The reason for including this control variable is that social 
networks influence the choices of households both directly and indirectly. For example, 
while a household can benefit directly from a social network if it has a household member   14
who migrated, a household can also benefit even if it does not have a household member 
who migrated, simply because social groups that receive more remittances will likely have 
more access to resources to start a business or other entrepreneurial activity. This 
externality effect can be controlled for by using an indicator of group wealth, such as the 
square of income of the ethno-religious group. 
The identification assumption of our model is then that conditional on the 
observable characteristics of the households, observable characteristics of the ethno-
religious groups, and regional and ethnic dummies, that our instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved components of the expenditure equation. This 
assumption is tested formally by a series of tests reported in Table 3.  The Anderson test 
(under-identification test) examines whether our instruments identify the equations, while 
the Cragg-Donald test (weak identification test) analyzes whether our instruments suffer 
from the weak instrument problem. The Anderson and Cragg-Donald test show that our 
instruments identify the second-stage equation and that our instruments are reasonably 
strong. 
16 It is important to mention that these tests were done on a linear version of the 
model. Given that the non-linearity of the model helps to identify the selection term in 
equation (4,) we believe that these tests are sufficient to show the importance of our 
instruments. 
The second-stage expenditure equation of the model can be estimated as follows: 
Household expenditure = g[Human Capital (Number of  
household members with primary, junior secondary, secondary or university 
education), Household Characteristics (Age of household head, Square of 
the Age of household head, Household size, Number of males over age 15,   15
Number of children under age 5), Migration Networks, (Number of female-
headed households receiving internal remittances (from Ghana) in 1998/99, 
Number of female-headed households receiving international remittances 
(from African or other countries) in 1998/99, Square of internal migrants in 
region in 1998/99), Ethno-religious Characteristics ( Square of  income of 
ethno-religious group), Regional and Ethnic Variables. Interactions]                                   
(9) 
                                                               
  In the second-stage equation the dependent variable is household expenditure, 
rather than household income, for the reasons noted above.    The rationale for including 
the various variables in equation (9) is similar to that for including them in the first-stage 
choice equation.  
 
4.  Estimating the Econometric Model with Selection Controls 
  Table 4 shows the results for the first-stage choice equation of the model. In the 
table most of the human capital variables are statistically insignificant; however, the 
variables for number of household members with secondary and university education are 
positively and significantly related to the probability of receiving international remittances 
(from African or other countries).  In the table only one household characteristic is 
significantly related to the receipt of either internal or international remittances: number of 
males over age 15 (negative). This result suggests that households with more male 
members of working age are less likely to receive remittances.  The table also reveals that   16
households that live in ethno-religious regions with more income have a higher probability 
of receiving international remittances  
Table 5 shows the results for the second-stage expenditure equation.  For two of the 
three groups of households – those with no remittances and those with internal remittances 
– more human capital is associated with higher levels of expenditure.  With respect to 
household characteristics, most of the variables are statistically insignificant.  However, as 
might be expected, larger households and those with more children under age 5 have 
significantly lower levels of per capita expenditure.   
In Table 5 it is important to note that the selection control variables (lambda) are 
insignificant for all three groups of households.  This means that controlling for the 
observable characteristics of the households, the observable characteristics of the ethno-
religious groups, the regional and ethnic dummies, and the various interaction terms 
included in the model, selection in unobservable characteristics is not a problem for 
households receiving either internal or international remittances in Ghana. 
 
5.  Estimating Predicted Expenditure Functions for the No Migration/Remittance 
Counterfactual 
  This section discusses how counterfactual expenditure estimates for households in 
the no migration/remittance situation can be developed by using predicted expenditure 
equations to identify the expenditures of households with and without internal and 
international remittances.  The methodology for obtaining these estimates follows the 
literature on the evaluation of programs for the case in which instrumental variables are 
available (Maddala, 1983; Wooldridge, 2002)   17
The methodology includes three steps.  First, we start with observed expenditures, 
meaning the levels of expenditures reported by households in the survey.  Second, we 
obtain predicted expenditures for households of type j, conditional on them choosing type j: 
E(yj|I=j ) = βj + ajX –σjρjφ[Jj(Xψj)]/ Fj(Xψj)                            (10) 
Third, we obtain counterfactual expenditures for households, defined as the 
expected value of expenditures for households of type r, conditional on them choosing type 
j: 
E(yr|I=j ) = βr + arX –σrρrjφ[Jj(Xψj)]/ Fj(Xψj)                            (11) 
Where σ2r=var (ur), φ is the pdf for the standard normal and ρrj is the correlation 
coefficient between ur and ε*j. Notice that we do not observe ρrj, so we make the 
assumption that ρrj= ρj.  
It is important to estimate σr for each equation. For this reason, equation (11) is 
estimated in two steps: (1) first, we estimate equation (7) for all types of households; and 
(2) second, we subtract from equation (7) σrρrφ[Jr(Xψr)]/ Fr(Xψr) and add the term 
[σjρjφ[Jj(Xψj)]/ Fj(Xψj)yj ]*( σr /σj ).  Finally, we compare equation (10) and equation (11) 
which gives the effect of remittances on the treated: 
Effect of remittances on households of type j=  E(yj|I=j )- E(yr|I=j )   (12) 
It should be emphasized that this measure of the effect of remittances on the treated 
is not contaminated by differences in either observable or unobservable characteristics. 
This would happen only if we compared observed expenditure values for households 
receiving remittances with observed expenditure values for households receiving no 
remittances.  
   18
6.  Expenditures, Remittances and Poverty  
  Table 6 reports observed, predicted and counterfactual expenditures for the three 
groups of households:  those receiving no remittances, those receiving internal remittances 
(from Ghana) and those receiving international remittances (from African and other 
countries).  On the basis of these expenditure levels, the table also reports levels of poverty 
based on a poverty line of 3,066,582 cedis/person/year which is equal to the poverty line 
used by the Ghana Statistical Service in 1998/1999, updated by inflation.
17   
Three different poverty measures appear in Table 6.  The first measure -- the 
poverty headcount -- shows the percent of the population living beneath the poverty line.  
However, this headcount index ignores the “depth of poverty,” that is, the amount by which 
the average expenditure of the poor fall short of the poverty line.  The table therefore 
reports a second measure, the poverty gap.  This index measures in percentage terms how 
far the average expenditures of the poor fall short of the national poverty line.  The third 
poverty measure -- the squared poverty gap – shows the “severity of poverty.”  The squared 
poverty gap index possesses useful analytical properties, because it is sensitive to changes 
in distribution among the poor.  In other words, while a transfer of expenditures from a 
poor person to a poorer person will not change the headcount index or the poverty gap 
index, it will decrease the squared poverty gap index.
18    
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that households with no remittances have 
mean per capita expenditures that situate them in the middle of the expenditure distribution 
of Ghana. For this reason, households with no remittances have less observed poverty on 
average than households receiving internal remittances (from Ghana), but more observed    19
poverty than households receiving international remittances (from African or other 
countries).  
  Column (3) of Table 6 shows that for observed expenditures, households receiving 
internal remittances (from Ghana) have the lowest mean per capita expenditure and have 
the highest observed poverty on average of all the household groups.  However, the poverty 
status of this group of households improves considerably with the receipt of remittances.   
Comparing the predicted poverty values in column (4) with the counterfactual poverty 
values in column (5) shows that for households with internal remittances, the receipt of 
internal remittances reduces the poverty headcount of this group of households by 69.4 
percent and the poverty gap by 42.7 percent.   
  Remittances also play an important role for households receiving international 
remittances (from African or other countries).  Column (6) shows that for observed 
expenditures, households receiving international remittances have the highest mean per 
capita expenditure and the lowest observed poverty on average of all the household groups.  
Moreover, the economic status of this group of households improves even further with the 
receipt of remittances.  Comparing the predicted poverty values in column (7) with the 
counterfactual poverty values in column (8) shows that for households with international 
remittances, the receipt of international remittances reduces the poverty headcount of this 
group of households by 88.1 percent, and the poverty gap by 90 percent.   
  Table 6 also shows that remittances have a negative impact on income inequality in 
Ghana.  For households with internal remittances, comparing the predicted inequality 
values in column (4) with the counterfactual inequality values in column (5) shows that for 
this group of households the receipt of internal remittances increases the Gini coefficient   20
by 4.0 percent.  For households with international remittances, comparing the predicted and 
counterfactual values in columns (7) and (8) shows that for this group of households the 
receipt of international remittances raises the Gini coefficient by 17.4 percent.  In other 
words, international remittances increase inequality in Ghana more than internal 
remittances. 
 
7.  Remittances, Poverty and Inequality 
One of the more interesting findings in Table 6 is that international remittances 
generally have a greater impact on reducing poverty and increasing inequality than internal 
remittances.  The only exception to this statement is that for the severity of poverty 
(squared poverty gap), the receipt of international remittances reduces poverty less than the 
receipt of internal remittances.  The question therefore arises:  Why do international 
remittances generally have a greater impact on reducing poverty and increasing inequality 
than internal remittances? 
One way of answering this question is to examine what kinds of expenditure groups 
of households receive internal and international remittances.   If, for example, households 
at the bottom of the expenditure distribution are receiving more international than internal 
remittances or if these “poor” households are receiving a greater proportion of their 
expenditures from international remittances, then international remittances will have a 
greater impact on poverty and inequality than internal remittances. 
  To pursue this analysis, Table 7 ranks all the households into decile groups on the 
basis of predicted per capita household expenditure (excluding remittances).  Columns (1) 
and (4) then show the proportion of total households receiving internal and international   21
remittances, respectively, in each decile group.  Columns (2) and (5) show the distribution 
of internal remittance-receiving and international remittance-receiving households, 
respectively, in each decile group.  For those households receiving remittances, columns 
(3) and (6) show the percent of total per capita household expenditure (including 
remittances) coming from internal or international remittances in each decile group.  
  In Table 7 it is useful to focus on the three lowest decile groups, which include all 
those households falling under the poverty line of  3,066,582 cedis/person/year.  If these 
three lowest deciles represent the “poor” in Ghana, then columns (2) and (4) of the table 
show that the proportion of poor households receiving internal remittances is much larger 
than the proportion of poor households receiving international remittances (12-25 percent 
for internal remittances vs. 1-3 percent for international remittances).  In other words, poor 
households are much more likely to receive internal remittances than international 
remittances.  However, in examining the impact of remittances on poverty, it is also 
important to consider the amount of money being received by remittance-receiving 
households.  Even though relatively few poor households receive international remittances, 
the average value of remittances (including money, food, goods) received by international 
remittance-receiving households is about 4 times that of the value of remittances received 
by internal remittance-receiving households (3,488,352 vs. 982,239 cedis).  For this reason, 
when households receive international remittances they tend to improve their economic 
status much more dramatically than when households receive internal remittances.   For 
instance, column (6)  of Table 7 show that for households located right near the poverty 
line – that is, households in the third decile group – international remittances represent 62.2 
percent of  total per capita household expenditure.  Thus, when remittances are included in   22
the expenditures of households receiving international remittances, the relatively small 
number of international remittance-receiving households that were poor before the receipt 
of remittances register very large improvements in their expenditures.  As a result, the level 
and depth of poverty (poverty headcount and poverty gap) change more when remittances 
are included in the expenditures of households receiving international remittances than 
when remittances are included in the expenditures of households receiving internal 
remittances. 
  Table 7 also helps answer the question:  Why do international remittances have a 
greater effect on increasing income inequality than internal remittances?   Focusing on the 
two top decile groups, columns (2) and (4) of the table show that far more households 
receiving international remittances are located in the top end of the expenditure distribution 
(8-12 percent for international remittances versus 1-3 percent for internal remittances).  
The fact that households receiving international remittances are well-off to begin with, 
coupled with the very large improvements in expenditure that come with the receipt of 
international remittances, means that the receipt of international remittances has a greater 
effect on raising income inequality than the receipt of internal remittances.     23
8.  Conclusion 
  This paper has used a new, 2005/06 nationally-representative household survey to 
analyze the impact of internal and international remittances on poverty and inequality in 
Ghana.  Three key findings emerge. 
  First, with respect to methodology, this paper develops counterfactual expenditure 
estimates for migrant and non-migrant households by using econometric estimations to 
predict the expenditures of households with and without remittances.  Since this method is 
problematic in the presence of selection bias, the paper uses a two-stage multinomial logit 
model to test for selection bias in the household receipt of remittances.  To ensure the 
exogeneity of variables, the selection model is estimated using an instrumental variables 
approach focusing on variations in migration networks and remittances among various 
ethno-religious groups in Ghana.  We find that controlling for the observable 
characteristics of the households, the observable characteristics of the ethno-religious 
groups, and regional and ethnic dummies, that selection in unobservable characteristics is 
not a problem for households receiving internal or international remittances in Ghana. 
Second, using the expenditure results of the two-stage model to estimate predicted 
and counterfactual expenditures for households with and without remittances, the paper 
finds that both internal and international remittances reduce the level, depth and severity of 
poverty in Ghana.  However, the size of the poverty reduction depends on the type of 
remittances being received.  In general, international remittances have a greater impact on 
reducing poverty than internal remittances.  For example, comparing the predicted and the 
counterfactual values for the poverty headcount measure shows that the inclusion of   24
international remittances reduces the level of poverty by 88.1 percent versus 69.4 percent 
for internal remittances. 
Third, this study shows that both internal and international remittances have a 
negative impact on income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient.  Comparing the 
predicted and the counterfactual values for the Gini coefficient shows that the inclusion of 
internal remittances raises income inequality by 4 percent versus 17.4 percent for 
international remittances.  International remittances have a more negative impact on 
income distribution because households receiving international remittances are not poor in 
the first place, and with the receipt of remittances they tend to improve their expenditure 
status much more dramatically than households receiving internal remittances.   25
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N 2515  1159  210     
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Table 1.  Summary Data on Non-Remittance and Remittance-Receiving Households (contd) 
 
Notes:   N = 3,884 households. All values are weighted; standard deviations in parentheses with the exception of columns (4) and (5) that show T-tests.  In 2006,  
US$ 1.00 = 9,000 Ghanaian cedis. 
 
Source:  2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample). 
 
  *  Significant at the 0.10 level. 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01   27









International remittances (from  
 African or other countries) 
received as percent of household 
income in group 
International migrants(to  
African or other countries) 
as percent of population in group 
1  205 5.28 7.2% 2.75%
2  239 6.15 6.1% 4.62%
3  550 14.16 7.0% 3.16%
4  44 1.13 10.2% 3.45%
5  110 2.83 6.5% 2.06%
6  193 4.97 4.9% 0.87%
7  245 6.31 8.2% 0.77%
8  572 14.73 5.0% 0.38%
9  42 1.08 2.9% 1.19%
10  159 4.09 2.9% 0.38%
11  234 6.02 1.4% 0.52%
12  104 2.68 7.9% 0.23%
13  269 6.93 1.6% 0.45%
14  547 14.08 8.3% 0.98%
15  371 9.55 2.9% 0.32%










Table 3. Tests for validity of instruments, Linear IV model 
 
 Tests     










(from African or other 
countries) as percent of 
household income  
International migrants (to 
Africa or other countries) as 
percent of population  
Chi^2 (1) 
12.73 




10% max IV 
7.03 














Receive internal remittances (from Ghana)  Receive international remittances 
(from African or other countries) 
Human Capital  Coefficient  Z  Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient Z  Marginal 
effects 
Number of members over 
age 15 with primary school 
education   0.567*** 2.59 1.16E-01 0.096 0.18  -4.07E-06
Number of members over 
age 15 with junior secondary 
school education  -0.111 -0.86 -2.27E-02 0.008 0.04  2.45E-06
Number of members over 
age 15 with secondary 
education  0.173 0.65 3.55E-02 0.865** 2.24  4.94E-05
Number of members over 
age 15 with university 
education  -0.730 -0.71 -1.50E-01 2.597** 2.35  1.70E-04
Household Characteristics          
Age of household head  0.004 0.03 -5.06E-02 0.381 1.01  2.30E-05
Square of age of household 
head  0.0002 0.19 5.00E-04 -0.004 -1.04  -2.43E-07
Household size  -0.026 -1.10 -5.40E-03 -0.034 -0.64  -1.61E-06
Number of males over age 
15  -0.363*** -6.24 -7.44E-02 -0.342*** -2.90  -1.44E-05
Number of children under 
age 5  0.148 0.33 3.04E-02 -1.047 -0.88  -6.61E-05
Migration Networks          
Number of female-headed 
households receiving internal 
remittances (from Ghana) in  
group in 1998/99  1.581 1.53 3.24E-01 1.016 0.49  3.40E-05 
Number of female-headed 
households receiving 
international remittances 
(from African or other 
countries) in group in 
1998/99  0.539 0.29 1.10E-01 -4.942 -0.57 -3.09E-04 
Square of internal migrants 












characteristic          
Square of income of ethno-




Instruments for second stage          
International remittances 
(from African or other 
countries) as percent of 
household income  27.596** 2.29 5.66E+00 -6.877 -0.32  -8.99E-04
International migrants (to 
Africa or other countries) as 
percent of population  -1.846 -0.73 -3.78E-01 -1.817 -0.22  -7.80E-05
Constant  -3.807 -1.09    -10.049 -1.13   
Log likelihood  -2789.04           
Likelihood ratio  676.06           
Pseudo R^2  10.81           
N 3884            
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Table 4.  Multinomial Logit Model for Ghana  (contd) 
 
Notes: Table reports the coefficients and marginal effects of a variable on the probability of a 
household receiving internal or international remittances.  In addition to the variables listed in the 
table, we also include as control variables:  the average number of rooms per capita in the region; 
interactions of age and squared age with the number of children below five years old in the 
household; interactions of age and squared age with the average number of rooms per capita in the 
region; interactions of squared age with seven ethnic dummies; the square of all the human capital 
variables; interactions of the human capital variables and the square of those variables with the 
number of children below five years old; and nine regional dummies and seven ethnic dummies. 
None of these variables are reported in the table.  All values are weighted.  Standard errors are 
clustered by ethno-religious group. They are bootstrapped standard errors.  
   
***  Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*       Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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Table 5.  Per Capita Household Expenditure  Estimates (Selection Corrected) for     
               Ghana, 2005/06 
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2 49.79  53.51  52.69 
Implied residual standard error  .5693  .5441  .4842 




Table 5.  Per Capita Household Expenditure Estimates (Selection Corrected)     
                (contd) 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is annual per capita household expenditure (including remittances). In 
addition to the variables listed in the table, we also include as control variables:  the average 
number of rooms per capita in the region; interactions of age and squared age with the number of 
children below five years old in the household; interactions of age and squared age with the 
average number of rooms per capita in the region; interactions of squared age with seven ethnic 
dummies; the square of all the human capital variables; interactions of the human capital variables 
and the square of those variables with the number of children below five years old; and nine 
regional dummies and seven ethnic dummies. None of these variables are reported in the table.  All 
values are weighted. Standard errors are clustered by ethno-religious group.  Figures in parentheses 
are t-values. 
 
    ***  Significant at the 0.01 level. 
    **   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
      *   Significant at the 0.10 level.   33
Table 6.  Effects of Remittances on Poverty for Non-Remittance and Remittance-Receiving Households, Ghana, 2005/06 
 
Receive 
 no remittances 
Receive internal remittances (from 
Ghana 
Receive international remittances (from 

























(4) vs (5)  (7) vs (8) 
Poverty 
 headcount ( %) 
30.24 21.26 35.43 12.81  41.86  4.87  .98  8.27 
-69.40 -88.15 








.43 .29 .41 .26  .25 .39 .27  .23 
4.00 17.39 




6,402 5,278 5,545 4,740  3,577 12,600 11,000  6,201 
32.51 77.39 
N 2515  2515  1159  1159  1159  210  210  210  1159  210 
Notes:  Columns (1), (3) and (6) show observed household per capita expenditure. Columns (2), (4) and (7) show predicted household expenditures, using equation 
for households of type s, with households of type s (equation 10). Columns (5) and (8) use equation (11), which is for households with no remittances on 
households with internal remittances (column 5) and households with international remittances (column 8). These estimations adjust the selection term as 
explained in section 5 of paper. Poverty calculations made using poverty line of 3,066,582 Ghanaian cedis/person/year, which is the 1998/99 Ghana poverty line, 
updated for inflation.  In 2006, US$ 1.00 = 9,000 Ghanaian cedis. 
 
Source: 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample).
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Table 7:  Proportion and Distribution of Remittance-Receiving Households by 




















































as a percent 







 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
(decile) (percent)  (percent)  (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) 
            
Lowest 
10  48.42 25.19 8.00 1.00 2.86  11.27
Second 
10  40.86 14.84 57.22 1.43 2.86  8.67
Third 10  37.85 12.77 11.27 2.56 4.76  62.18
Fourth 
10  36.83 11.82 15.60 3.49 6.19  21.75
Fifth 10  33.52 10.18 19.67 4.83 8.10  28.34
Sixth 10  27.84 8.46 17.12 9.66 16.19  26.51
Seventh 
10  21.57 6.38 19.06 6.41 10.48  17.64
Eighth 
10  19.71 5.87 19.58 8.12 13.33  40.74
Ninth 10  11.90 3.62 21.20 12.18 20.48  28.42
Top 10  2.84 0.86 35.62 8.81 14.76  22.93




Notes:  Households ranked into decile groups on the basis of predicted per capita household 
expenditure (excluding remittances). Predicted household expenditure is based on 
equation (10) in text. However, data on remittance reception and the amount of 
remittances received is based on observations. Columns (1) and (4) show the 
proportion of households receiving remittances in the given deciles. Columns (2) 
and (5) show the distribution of remittances by deciles. Columns (3) and (6) show 
remittances as a fraction of household expenditure (including remittances).  
 
Source: 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample). 
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1 The following studies have analyzed the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality in Latin America 
and Asia:   Acosta et al  (2006) on Latin America, Lokshin et al (2007) on Nepal, Adams on Guatemala 
(2004), Taylor, Mora and Adams on Mexico (2005) and Yang and Martinez on the Philippines (2005). 
 
2Studies on remittances and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa include:  Litchfield and Waddington on Ghana 
(2003) and Gustafsson and Makonnen  on Lesotho (1993).       
 
3 According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2000: Table 2), in 1998/99 the poverty headcount index in 
Ghana was 39.5 percent.  This index measures the share of the population living below the poverty line.   
 
4 According to the 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample), roughly five times as many households in 
Ghana receive internal as opposed to international remittances (1159 versus 210 households, respectively).  
However, the average value received of internal remittances is only about 30 percent that of international 
remittances:  982,239 versus 3,488,352 Ghanaian cedis/person/year, respectively.  See text.   
 
5 For other attempts to treat remittances as a substitute for home earnings and to predict (estimate) the 
incomes of households with and without migration, see Barham and Boucher (1998) and Adams (1991).   
 
6 This migration and remittances module included about 45 questions on the socio-economic characteristics 
of current migrants, including their age, educational status, occupation and amount of remittances (cash, 
food and non-food goods) sent home. 
 
7 Non-food goods include such items as household appliances (stoves, refrigerators), vehicles and 
equipment.  
 
8 In the 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample) only 49 percent of internal migrants (within Ghana) 
and 68 percent of international migrants (to African and other countries) remit.  These figures are similar to 
those observed in other countries.  For example, in their study in the Dominican Republic, de la Briere, 
Sadoulet, de Janvry and Lambert (2002) find that only one- half of all international migrants remit. 
 
9 In the 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample) 56 percent of households receiving internal 
remittances (from Ghana) and 50 percent of households receiving international remittances (from African 
or other countries) do not have a migrant.  On average, non-migrant households that receive remittances 
receive less in per capita remittances than migrant households that receive remittances.  
 
10 This paper will follow the convention of using expenditure rather than income data to examine poverty in 
Ghana for the following reasons.  First, since households tend to use savings to smooth fluctuations in 
income, many economists believe that expenditures provide a more accurate measure of household welfare 
over time.  Second, in developing country situations like Ghana, expenditures are typically easier to 
measure than income because of the many problems inherent in defining and measuring income for the 
self-employed in agriculture, who represent such a large proportion of the labor force. 
 





                                                                                                                                                 
12 Ideally, we would like to model both the household decision of sending migrants and the household 
decision to receive remittances. However, as explained in the data section, this cannot be done because of 
the limited number of households (n=184) producing international migrants.  
 
13 Eleven religious groups are listed in the 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample).  The largest of 
these groups is Catholic, accounting for 15.9 percent of all households.  Other large religious groups 
include:  “other Christian” (15.5 percent), Pentecostal (13.3 percent), Presbyterian (11.3 percent), Muslim 
(11.8 percent) and Methodist (9.8 percent). 
 
14 Over thirty ethnic groups are listed in the 2005/06 Ghana GLSS 5 Survey (sub-sample).  The largest of 
these ethnic groups is the Asante group, accounting for 17.4 percent of all households.  Other large ethnic 
groups in the survey include:  “other Akan” (12.6 percent), Fanti (11.2 percent), Ewe (11.4 percent), and 
Ga-adangbe (8.4 percent) 
 
15 While early work on the human capital model found that education had a positive impact on migration 
(Schultz, 1982; Todaro, 1976), more recent empirical work in Egypt (Adams, 1991and 1993) and Mexico 
(Mora and Taylor, 2005; Taylor, 1987) has found that migrants are not necessarily positively selected with 
respect to education.  
 
16 Other variables measured at the level of the ethno-religious group were also tested as potential controls, 
but they turned out to be irrelevant. Similarly, other variables were also tested as potential instruments but 
they did not pass the over-identification test (Hansen J-test).  We also performed a Hausman test that shows 
that coefficients from the IV estimation do not differ systematically from the coefficients from an OLS 
estimation. We chose to follow the IV estimation because of the strength of  our instruments, which 
suggests that instruments are needed to  reduce any possibility of endogeneity bias in our estimation. 
 
17 The 1998/99 poverty line is of 684,401 cedis/person/year, which is equivalent to the poverty headcount 
index of 39.5 percent that is cited as the 1998/99 poverty line for Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000:  
Table 2).This poverty line is defined as the level of per capita expenditures needed to meet the costs of 
meeting basic food and non-food requirements in Ghana.  For more details on this expenditure-based 
poverty line, see Ghana Statistical Service (2000). 
 
18 This characteristic is called the weak transfers principle. The square poverty gap does not posses a third 
characteristic that is also desired in poverty measures. That characteristic is called the principle of transfer 
sensitivity, which establishes that a given regressive transfer between two poor people must increase the 
poverty index more when the persons involved are poorer (Ray, 1998).  